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\begin{document}

\title{Overcoming History Through Exit or Integration --\\
 Deep-rooted Sources of Support\\
 for the European Union}

\author{Kai Gehring (University of Zurich)}
\maketitle
\begin{abstract}
\noindent The origins of voter preferences about the vertical distribution
of political power in federal systems are not well understood. I argue
that negative historical experiences with higher-level governments
can raise demands both for exit strategies and a decentralization
of power, but also for upward integration. I specify conditions when
delegating power upwards, e.g., from the nation-state to a supra-national
level or international organization, can better serve the purpose
of constraining nation-state actions to overcome history. Empirically,
the quasi-random division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine
allows estimating differences in support for integration with a spatial
regression discontinuity design. More negative exposure to nation-state
actions causes persistently higher support for European integration
in three referenda and less Euroscepticism in EU elections. Survey
evidence supports exit and integration as two complementary alternatives.
Both options can serve the purpose of moving power away from the government
level associated with negative historical experiences. 

\textit{\footnotesize{}}\\
\textit{\scriptsize{}Keywords: Nation-states, Federalism, Supra-national
integration, International Organizations, Secession, Minority Regions,
Persistence, European Union Support, Euroscepticism, European Identity.}\\
\textit{\scriptsize{}Acknowledgments: I thank the editors, four anonymous
referees, as well as Victor Araujo, Christian Bjornskov, Allison Carnegie,
Axel Dreher, James Fearon, Florian Foos, Vicky Fouka, Andreas Fuchs,
Judith Goldstein, Pauline Grosjean, David Laitin, Gary Marks, Katharina
Michaelowa, Jonathan Rodden, Christina Schneider, Kenneth Schultz,
Marco Steenbergen, Yuki Takagi, and Stefanie Walter for helpful comments,
as well as seminar participants at Central European University, the
University of Zurich, Stanford University, and at the EPCS Meeting
in Jerusalem, the Beyond Basic Questions Workshop in Kiel, and the
2019 CESifo Summer Institute: Future of Europe in Venice. I thank
Ulrich Doraszelski, Raphael Franck, Franz Zobl, Noel Johnson, Eunhye
Kim and the département archives in Alsace and Lorraine for sharing
data and verifying historical sources, and Lukas Willi, Bahar Zafer,
Nelson Mesker, Jan Gromadzki, and Dante Povinelli for excellent research
assistance. I acknowledge financial support from a Swiss National
Science Foundation (SNSF) Ambizione grant PZ00P1\_174049.}{\scriptsize\par}
\end{abstract}
\textit{\scriptsize{}Kai Gehring, University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse
56, Zurich CH-8050, Switzerland, e-mail:mail@kai-gehring.net, orcid.org/0000-0003-2576-4245.}{\scriptsize\par}

\pagebreak{}

\section*{Introduction}

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Understanding voter preferences about the vertical distribution of
power in multi-layered political systems is a key topic for political
science and related disciplines, but little attention has been paid
to the deep-rooted factors shaping these preferences.\footnote{This also holds true more generally regarding the preferences of citizens
in all types of political systems, but this paper focuses on democracies
and the voting process. } Consider that we observe a backlash against globalization and supra-national
integration in many countries, but certain regions within those countries
resist the trend. Scotland is a region that experienced tensions with
the central United Kingdom (UK) government throughout history. A plausible
and widespread assumption is that such regions and groups support
\textit{exit }strategies: decentralization, more autonomy, or even
outright secession. However, while there was a positive trend in the
vote share of the secessionist Scottish National Party, Scottish public
support for European integration also increased by 25 percent from
1979 to 1997.\footnote{The Scottish Election Study allows tracing support for EU integration
over time. The SNP vote share increased from 17.3 in 1979 to 22.1
in 1997. It varies between individual elections, due to aspects like
oil discoveries or tensions with the current UK government, but the
long-term trend is clearly positive. Other regions in the EU like
South Tyrol, Corsica or Catalonia exhibit a similar positive correlation
between support for regionalist parties and EU integration.} The region also clearly favored integration in the Brexit referendum,
even though integration also means a centralization of power. 

This might seem paradoxical at first, but I sketch a theoretical framework
of \textit{exit} and \textit{integration} that can explain such preferences.
It explains under what conditions negative historical experiences
with higher-level governments cause individuals in minority regions
to support integration -- e.g., to a supra-national level or international
organization (IO) -- as a means to prevent history from repeating
itself. After WW1 highlighted the risk of conflict between nation-states
and created new national minorities, this idea of integration emerged
and culminated in the foundation of the League of Nations. I explain
that integration is a relevant alternative or complementary strategy
when exit strategies are costly, integration is perceived as helping
minority regions, and the salience of historical tensions and the
role of integration as a remedy is high enough. 

I apply this framework to the European Union (EU), which can be considered
as one of the most advanced international/ inter-governmental organizations,
as well as an ambitious attempt to develop a multi-level system through
supra-national integration. One reason to choose Europe is that ``both
nationalism and state formation, in their modern, territorial sense,
originated in Europe'' \citep[p.8]{cederman1997emergent}. Conflicts
between nation-states were prevalent for centuries, and France and
Prussia were the first states to implement systematic nation-building
policies to assimilate minority groups, by force if necessary. European
integration was always linked to peace and the idea of constraining
powerful nation-state members, and this aspect became particularly
salient for minority groups and regions since the 1990s. 

Empirically, prior studies document a correlation between being a
minority region and support for EU integration \citep[e.g.,][]{jolly2015european},
but causally attributing this to specific historical experiences,
like negative exposure to the higher-level nation-states, is inherently
difficult. Causal analysis requires a coherent way to assess negative
exposure, a suitable treatment and control group, exogenous historical
differences in negative exposure, and the possibility to observe treatment
and control units in the same institutional environment today. This
is very hard to achieve in a large cross-sectional panel.

Examining specific cases solves some of the difficulties, but remains
challenging. For instance, the southern part of the Austrian region
Tyrol was occupied during WW1 and exposed to repressive nation-state
policies by Italy afterwards. Today, this Italian part is described
as a region strongly supporting EU integration.\footnote{See \href{https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/south-tyrol-from-secessionist-to-european-dreams}{https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/south-tyrol-from-secessionist-to-european-dreams}
, \href{http://www.provinz.bz.it/news/de/news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_id=590314\#accept-cookies}{http://www.provinz.bz.it/news/de/news.asp?news\_action=4\&news\_article\_id=590314\#accept-cookies},
and \href{https://kurier.at/politik/inland/suedtiroler-landesthauptmann-kompatscher-die-eu-als-groesseres-ganzes/306.514.568}{https://kurier.at/politik/inland/suedtiroler-landesthauptmann-kompatscher-die-eu-als-groesseres-ganzes/306.514.568}.
Accessed 23.08.2019.} However, as the counterfactual northern part remained in Austria,
we cannot distinguish historical exposure from current political differences.
In Spain, Catalonia was clearly exposed to nation-state repression
during the Franco-era, and the electorate and regional parties today
are supporters of EU integration. However, the empirical challenge
is that Catalonia differs from other potential counter-factual Spanish
regions in many other aspects like current political tensions as well
as all its unique history ranging back for centuries.

To solve this empirical challenge, I provide evidence from the initially
homogeneous French-German border regions Alsace and Lorraine, which
were split in a quasi-random way after the Franco-Prussian war in
1871. As I will explain in more detail, the eastern ``treated''
part clearly had more negative experiences with nation-state actions
over the next about 80 years. Both parts belong to the same French
administrative region today, so I can disentangle the effect of the
historical treatment from contemporary differences. Using a municipal-level
spatial regression discontinuity design at the former border, I find
that more negative exposure to nation-state actions caused higher
support in three referenda about European integration and less Euroscepticism
in European parliamentary elections.

These results are robust to different implementations of the RD estimation
and various robustness and placebo tests. Regarding mechanisms, I
find no discontinuities in population changes, socioeconomic differences
or public good provision, which could have been caused by the natural
experiment and affect the outcome. Instead, I find that EU support
is associated with a stronger European identity -- in line with \citet{hooghe2019theory}
-- which is not related to higher perceived monetary benefits of
EU membership. Finally, I present survey evidence showing that exit
and integration -- regionalization or delegation to the European
level -- are indeed complementary alternatives for respondents in
the treated area.

One contribution of my paper is to outline a theoretical framework
of how past experiences with higher-level governments shape individual
preferences about the vertical distribution of power. This complements
existing important contributions about nation-building and the relationship
between nation-state conflicts and nation-building policies \citep[e.g.,][]{anderson2006imagined,gellner2008nations,hobsbawm1990,tilly1995citizenship}.
\citet{mylonas2013politics} began to link nation-building and international
relations by showing how external powers associated with domestic
minority groups influence policies towards these groups. Similarly,
my paper connects two lines of research that have so far been largely
analyzed in isolation: the long-term effects of historical events
on political preferences and outcomes and support for supra-national
integration and international organizations. My causal evidence thus
augments other studies about long term persistence \citep{Acharya2016,becker2015,mazumder2018,nisbett2018culture}
by documenting persistent effects of differences in historical exposure
on preferences regarding the vertical distribution of power.

I study negative experiences of a ``group'' in a case where the
group is a minority compared to the nation as a whole but a majority
within their home region. In contrast, most existing papers consider
the effect of nation-state repression on minority immigrant groups
within a foreign host country \citep{fouka2016,fouka2017,komisarchik2019political}.
Such repressive policies against minorities can backfire, as argued
by \citet{cederman1997emergent}. Empirically, \citet{dehdarigehring2018origins}
show the effect of repression on the formation of a stronger regional
identity, and \citet{rozenas_zhukov_2019} provide a more nuanced
argument when repression in an occupied area raises opposition towards
the foreign occupier. My paper extends those analyses by highlighting
how such negative experiences with higher-level governments can also
foster support for delegating political power upwards through integration.

This allows a better understanding of preferences about the vertical
distribution of power, which is crucial for the study of federalism \citep[e.g.,][]{dreher2017information,rodden2006hamilton,rodden2004comparative}.
Understanding how the interests of different levels of government
can strategically influence preferences about (de-)centralization
has been a core question dating back to the federalist papers \citep{hamilton2008federalist}.
It also relates to political economic theories about the optimal size
of nations \citep{alesina1997number}, but those focus more on economic
arguments. I highlight that decentralization and upward integration
can be complementary strategies for voters in lower-level entities
that are concerned about political decisions of higher-level governments.
This also connects my study to the literature on secessionist conflict,
which has largely focused on \textit{exit} strategies \citep[e.g.,][]{Cederman15}
as the most plausible reaction to tensions with the central state. 

Finally, by considering attitudes towards shifting decision-making
to the international level, I relate to the international relations
literature on regional integration \citep{schneider2017political},
the political economy of international organizations in general \citep[reviewed in][]{dreherpoliticalIO2019}
and the EU in particular \citep{GehringSchneider2016}, and the impact
of IO conditionality \citep[e.g.,][]{carnegie2014states,dreher2004public,gehring2020stigma}.
My results complement the existing literature examining EU support
\citep[e.g.,][]{Gehring_russiathreat2020,hooghe2004does,marks2004european,sanchez2000political}
and Euroscepticism \citep[e.g.,][]{de2018euroscepticism}. To a large
extent, the EU support literature is focused on correlational evidence
regarding individual level attributes or current domestic aspects
as explanatory factors. Hooghe and Marks \citeyearpar{hooghe2004does,hooghe2005calculation}
highlight the role of identity as a potential source of support for
the EU, but they take identities as given and cannot exploit exogenous
variation in their strength. My paper is, to the best of my knowledge,
the first to provide causal evidence on deep-rooted structural reasons
for existing differences in EU support, and suggests identity as one
key channel.


\section*{Theory and Application to EU and Alsace-Lorraine\label{sec:Theory and historical background}}

\subsection*{Historical Experiences and the Exit vs. Integration Decision}

 How are individual preferences and voting decisions about the vertical
allocation of power influenced by negative historical experiences
with nation-state governments? I begin by outlining some more universal
aspects of how history relates to exit and integration options. Then,
I apply the framework to a specific geographic area and type of integration
-- the European Union (EU) -{}- and discuss the desirability of exit
and integration options for individuals in this context. Finally I
zoom in on a particular case that allows isolating the causal effect
of historical negative experiences with nation-states on preferences
about EU integration. 

I am focusing on individuals in minority regions - referring to an
ethnic, linguistic or otherwise distinct group. The aggregated votes
of those individuals can affect governments and parties, but in this
paper I am not trying to explain the behavior of those actors. For
the sake of emphasizing the main argument, this assumes that higher-level
policies are exogenously given or imposed top-down, which is not implausible
given that minorities usually cannot control central governments.
Regional parties can help to maintain or shape historical memories,
but my interest here are historical experiences as a root cause of
current individual preferences.\footnote{In line with \citet{Brubaker1998}, I assume that regional elites
can only strengthen or weaken existing preferences, but that they
cannot create those preferences without an underlying historical basis.
Thus, in my framework, regional elites could change the magnitude,
but not the direction of the effect of historical experiences.}

Individuals vote on how much decision-making power to allocate at
different levels in a multi-level governance structure, e.g. at the
regional level, the nation-state level, and a higher international
level. Voters are rational to the extent that they base their vote
on a comparison of the costs and benefits of these alternatives. Instrumental
aspects like economic concerns or the quality of and alignment with
different governance levels matter, but culture does as well. Culture
matters as our identities influence “how we are to calculate our interests”
\citep[p. 292]{Brubaker1998}. The stronger an identity at a particular
level, the more positive the cost-benefit considerations about decision-making
at that level.

The main examples of negative experiences with nation-states are conflicts
between nation-states and repressive nation-building policies in those
regions. \citet{rokkan1999state}, for instance, describes center-periphery
cleavages as stemming from nation-building policies that tried to
homogenize minorities by force. Negative experiences also occur if
a region experiences broken nation-building processes (see, e.g.,
\citealp{rokkan1969models}, and \citealp{anderson2006imagined}).
Broken nation-building policies are often related to war between nation-states,
for instance when an area is annexed by the winner of a war and then
integrated by force into the new-nation state. However, negative experiences
are broader than intrusive nation-building policies, as exposure to
war between nation-states itself - even without specific homogenization
policies -- can also affect preferences permanently.

These negative historical experiences with the nation-state could
enter into individuals' decisions about the vertical allocation of
power in different ways. For instance, they can increase the perceived
likelihood of future negative nation-state actions or the perceived
costs associated with them. Moreover, they can shape group identities
\citep[see][]{tilly1995citizenship}, strengthening regional and possibly
higher-level identities relative to national identity. Regarding the
optimal net decision of an individual, each decision-making level
also has specific other costs and benefits. Hence, the optimal decision
does not have to be allocating all power to one level and is conditional
on those other dimensions. The important feature I want to highlight
is that, all else equal, negative experiences make the allocation
of decision-making power at the nation-state level relatively less
attractive for individuals in affected minority regions.

This can foster support for exit strategies -- delegating power downwards
through more autonomy -- but also support for integration -- delegating
political power further upwards.\footnote{Drawing on the exit vs. voice distinction in \citet{hirschman1970exit}.}
Exit strategies have been the focus of most scholars working on areas
with existing tensions between regions and central states \citep[e.g.,][]{cederman2007beyond,MorelliRohner2014}.
In contrast, I outline three criteria that determine whether history
also increases support for upward integration as an alternative or
complementary strategy to exit. Those are the costs and political
feasibility of exit strategies, the benefits of supra-national integration
or IOs in overcoming history, and the salience of historical experiences.

The first criterion regarding the vertical allocation of power is
the feasibility and costs of exit strategies. Outright secession is
risky and has a very low likelihood of success against more powerful
higher-level governments. Even political decentralization and more
autonomy are often hard to achieve due to commitment problems and
might not be sufficient to satisfy demands for exit \citep{Cederman15}.
Moreover, remaining part of a larger state ensures economic benefits
like a more efficient provision of public goods and better trade opportunities
\citep{alesina1997number}. The extent of those costs depends on current
national political institutions and policies, but the relevant insight
is that exit options are always also associated with costs. 

For integration to be considered a relevant alternative or complementary
strategy for individuals in minority regions, a second criterion is
the ability of integration to overcome history. Integration can create
mutual benefits by enabling cooperation, which minority members take
into account as well. But in addition, depending on their historical
experiences, I argue that they value the supra-national level's or
IO's ability to limit the likelihood of future nation-state conflict
or discriminatory actions against minorities relatively more \citep[cf.,][]{hooghe2019theory}.

Integration can be regarded as a means for rational actors - here
nation-state governments - to engage in a governance contract that
creates benefits, but also imposes constraints on specific choices
they would otherwise make. IOs can constrain the choice set of their
member-states by setting conditions for access, conditions for specific
programs \citep[e.g.,][]{birchler2016aid,dreher2009imf}, and enforcing
rules among their members.\footnote{From a game-theoretical perspective, it can thus act as a commitment
device. This can prevent national governments from actions that might
in the short run be good for themselves, but bad for others, or actions
like free-riding on public good provision that would in the long run
even be bad for themselves.} To ensure that integration promotes peace, scholars emphasize democratic
rules \citep{Pevehouse2006} and the existence of sophisticated institutional
structures \citep{boehmer2004intergovernmental}, including centralized
courts and efficient enforcement mechanisms. 

A third criterion is that the salience of both historical negative
experiences with higher-level governments and the role of integration
as a potential remedy must be sufficiently high. It seems plausible
that the more frequent, the more negative, and the longer lasting
those negative experiences were, the more likely that they remain
salient today and have the potential to influence behavior. Individual
knowledge or investment is not necessarily required. It can be sufficient
if organizations like regional associations, parties, or the media
either invest in keeping these memories alive and communicating them
and potential remedies to voters, ``reactivating'' historical experiences
\citep[see, e.g.,][]{foukavoth2016,roesel2017}.

The idea that supra-national integration can avoid conflict and protect
minority groups emerged in the 19th century and culminated in the
foundation of the League of Nations after WW1. The League frequently
discussed minority problems, and its World Court ruled repeatedly
in defense of national minorities. However, it lacked the means to
enforce those rulings \citep{zahra2008minority}. Similarly, after
WW2, the United Nations (UN) as its successor ratified an ``International
Covenant'' to protect national minorities against nation-states,
but it also struggles to enforce these rulings. Accordingly, a decisive
feature to make integration a desirable aim for regions with negative
historical experiences is the ability to not only detect and judge
potential misbehavior, but also enforce decisions to maintain peace
and stop discrimination. 

There are various attempts to use integration and IOs to facilitate
peace and fight discrimination against minority groups today. The
African Union has engaged and taken up mandates to prevent wars and
act against mistreatment of minorities, albeit with limited success.
\citet{mylonas2013politics} argues that ASEAN had some influence
on reducing exclusionary policies and making accommodation a more
likely strategy in South-East Asia. The OSCE and the Council of Europe
supposedly have been ``a significant driving force'' to achieve
better treatment of minorities in post-Soviet countries \citep[see also][p. 185]{mylonas2013politics}.
In federal systems, minority protection is usually assigned to higher-level
governments, or defined as a constitutional right that can be enforced
by central courts. Hence, the concept of using integration to overcome
historical problems seems widely relevant.\footnote{Think for instance about the experience of minority groups with sub-national
units of decision-making like the states in federal systems like the
US.}


\subsection*{Application to the European Union}

To demonstrate the empirical relevance of my framework, I apply it
to the case of regions and nation-states that are members of the European
Union (EU). The EU is an international organization, but it is also
the most ambitious recent attempt to establish a multi-level governance
system through supra-national integration. As \citet{cederman1997emergent}
describes, Europe is the origin of modern nationalism. Nationalism
in Europe is inseparably associated with aggressive nation-building
policies against minority regions as well as reoccurring conflicts
between nation-states that affected in particular border-regions.
There thus exist many tensions between regions and nation-states that
are grounded in history, and the memory of conflicts between nation-states
in a competition for power and space is still vivid. The next paragraphs
apply my framework to the EU case and examine to what degree the three
criteria are satisfied. 

First, what about the feasibility and costs of exit options? Decentralization
is clearly not impossible in the EU, and there has been some successful
devolution of power within member states, like the establishment of
regional parliaments in the UK. Overall, however, a region's political
power compared to national governments is limited. Many attempts to
decentralize or attain more autonomy have failed, most recently visible
in the failed Catalan attempts to achieve independence from Spain.
The widespread existence of separatist parties underscores under-satisfied
demands for exit strategies. At the same time, the economic costs
of exit options are highlighted by the dependence of separatist party
success on perceived economic benefits \citep{gehringReg2016}. Hence,
alternative or complementary strategies to exit are desirable for
individuals in minority regions.

Regarding the second criterion, credibility, the EU has certainly
strengthened  regions against the nation-states, in particular those
representing a linguistic or ethnic minority. Certain EU institutions,
in particular the Committee of the Regions, allow regions to ``bypass
national governments'' \citep{jolly2007} and ensure ``the protection
of regional cultures'' \citep[p.13]{panara2019europe}. The Treaty
of the EU (TEU) article 4(2) specifies respect for ``regional and
local self-government'', and the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria from 1993
demand ``respect for and protection of minorities.'' 

The EU is also seen as having ``the leverage to enforce commitments
{[}...{]} for the protection of national minorities'' \citep[p.279]{galbreath2012european}.
The European Court of Justice plays a key role in that regard. \citet[p.171]{garrett1995politics}
explains that, ``the court exercises judicial review {[}...{]} over
the behavior of governments.'' For instance, the court ruled to protect
the fiscal autonomy of regions in the landmark ``Portugal vs. Commission''
case. In the ``Izsák-Dabas vs. Commission'' case, the court decided
against the nation-states that an initiative aimed at improving the
situation of national minority regions had to be allowed. EU institutions
cannot fully control member states, but it is sufficient that they
are perceived as lowering the relative likelihood of nation-state
conflicts and repressive policies against minority regions.

Regarding the third aspect, salience, peace and respect for cultural
diversity have been crucial aspects since the early days of European
cooperation. Take Robert Schuman, one of the EU's founding fathers.
He himself experienced repression while living in the Lorrainian city
of Metz, and as a parliamentarian for an Alsace-Lorrainian party he
advocated for more autonomy from the central state -- an exit option.
However, later he began to recognize ``international cooperation
as a way to maintain peace'' \citep[p. 268]{zanoun2009interwar}.
In a famous 1949 speech in Strasbourg, Schuman -- then French foreign
minister -- called all European countries to ``attempt and succeed
in reconciling nations in a supranational association. This would
safeguard the diversities and aspirations of each nation{[}...{]}.''
These principles were formalized in the ``Schuman Declaration''
in 1950 and became the basis of the European Coal and Steel Community,
the predecessor of the EU. Jean Monnet, another founding father, described
EU integration as a process to ``go beyond the concept of a nation,''
and Konrad Adenauer, first German chancellor after WW2, called it
an ``antidote to nationalism.''

Actors representing regions ensure this aspect remains salient. Generally,
regional governments and regional parties perceive the EU ``as an
ally against the central state'' \citep[p. 110]{jolly2007}. The
Council of European Municipalities and Regions recognizes the EU's
contribution to ``respect for regional and local self-government
as part of national identities.'' The Federal Union of European Nationalities,
an interest group representing minority regions, publicly praises
the importance of the EU in protecting and promoting minority regions.
Its ``Minority SafePack'' initiative to protect minority languages
and cultures was widely featured in the media and, among others, supported
by South Tyrol and the Basque country.\footnote{See \href{http://www.minority-safepack.eu/\#about}{http://www.minority-safepack.eu/\#about},
accessed 10.03.2019.} 

Looking at data reveals a positive correlation between EU support
and being in a border region \citep{gabel1995understanding}, and
with perceiving one's region in a struggle with the central nation-state
\citep{jolly2015european}. Prior studies also find a relationship
between a region having a problematic history with nation-states and
higher EU support \citep{jolly2007} -- all in line with my argumentation
but without being able to claim causality. An individual's decision
about her preferred level of vertical power allocation is influenced
by a large number of other factors. This makes it hard to establish
convincing counterfactuals for a large number of cases in different
regions and nation-states with distinct histories and move beyond
showing correlations. Instead of trying to provide a better estimate
of this correlation in a large multi-region sample, I thus focus on
the French-German border region Alsace and Lorraine as a specific
historical natural experiment. 


\subsection*{The Division of Alsace and Lorraine as a Natural Experiment}

\autoref{fig:timeline} illustrates the relevant history of Alsace
and Lorraine in a simplified way. Regarding the existence of a suitable
counterfactual, it is most relevant that the whole region had been
French for more than a century before it was divided. Both Alsace
and Lorraine became autonomous political entities as far back as the
7th century, were united in the Duchy of Lotharingia, and became fully
integrated into France in 1767. This means that, starting with Napoleon,
the whole region experienced the same French nation-building policies.
There are no reasons to expect systematic differences in attitudes
towards the nation-state or the region. The left-hand side of \autoref{fig:historical_maps}
shows a map of the region prior to 1870, with the six pre-1870 départements,
and the four major cities in the region.

\begin{figure}[H]
\caption{Alsace and Lorraine: Départements Before and After Division in 1870/71
\label{fig:historical_maps}}
 \centering

%\hspace{-4cm}%
\begin{tabular}{>{\centering}p{8cm}>{\centering}p{8cm}}
\hspace{-0.5cm}\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{Graphs/Fig1a_Division_cuts_through_pre1870_departement_borders} & \hspace{-1cm}\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{Graphs/Fig1b_Current departements}\tabularnewline
\centering \scriptsize \textbf{A.) Division cuts through existing pre-1870 département borders.} & \centering \scriptsize \textbf{B.) Current départements. Division did not follow historical language border.}\tabularnewline
\end{tabular}\vspace{0.5cm}

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth} \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} Author's depictions using ArcGIS and official administrative shapefiles. Linguistic border georeferenced from \citet{harp1998}.} 
\end{minipage}
\vspace{0cm}
\end{figure}

The division that I exploit for causal identification originates from
the Peace Treaty that ended the Franco-Prussian War (July 19, 1870
to May 10, 1871). Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of Prussia, did not
aim for territorial gains with this war but wanted to unite all German
states against their arch-enemy, France and agree on founding a German
nation-state \citep{wawro2005franco}. Still, the successful German
army occupied parts of France including all of Alsace and Lorraine
and then besieged Paris. The following peace negotiations with France
were dominated by disagreement in the German leadership about its
territorial expansion. The independent military leadership under the
charismatic general Helmuth von Moltke \citep{forster1870general}
wanted to keep the whole region Alsace and Lorraine. Bismarck thought
of this as a ``major folly'' and source of future wars. If anything,
he wanted to restrict expansion to the eastern German-dialect speaking
areas \citep{lipgens1964bismarck}.

The negotiation process is described as dominated by pride and the
clash between these two strong characters \citep{wawro2005franco}.
For instance, Bismarck was willing to hand over Metz and the surrounding
Lorrainian areas in the north (see map), but von Moltke refused, as
he considered taking the city one of his major achievements. The final
border was a compromise that was decided upon centrally in Versailles,
which was drawn on a map largely ignoring local circumstances like
existing identities, language or military-strategic considerations
\citep{Messerschmidt1975}. Bismarck, ``quite uncharacteristically
wilted under the pressure'' \citep[p.305]{wawro2005franco} to annex
larger parts -- about half of the region. Figure \ref{fig:historical_maps}
B. confirms that the resulting treatment border (i.) does not follow
the historical linguistic border between French an German dialect
speakers, (ii.) the existing pre-1870 département borders, (iii.)
nor any older historical border.\footnote{Verified using various maps from different medieval periods.}
Hence, for causal identification I treat the border as as-good-as-random,
an assumption I examine in more detail later.

Large parts, but not all of Alsace, were transformed into the German
districts of \textit{Oberelsass} and \textit{Unterelsass}, which correspond
to today's French départements \textit{Haut-Rhin} and \textit{Bas-Rhin}.
In the northern Lorraine area Germany created the district \textit{Lothringen,}
cutting right through the prior Lorrainian départements. This corresponds
to today’s département \textit{Moselle}. In the remaining ``control''
area in the west, France created the départements \textit{Meurthe-et-Moselle},
\textit{Meuse} and \textit{Vosges, }all still existing today. The
eastern ``treated'' area in the region is often referred to as Alsace-Lorraine.
It remained German until WW1; afterwards, the ``lost provinces''
\citep{harvey1999lost} were re-integrated into France and since then
again belong to the same French region.

\begin{figure}
\label{fig:timeline}\caption{Simplified Timeline of Events in Alsace-Lorraine}
 \centering


\hspace{-1.5cm}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Graphs/Fig2_timeline1.pdf}

\vspace{-0cm}

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}
\footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} Author's creation. The timeline provides a simplified version of the events in the French-German border regions Alsace and Lorraine. The Franco-Prussian War caused a split of the initially homogenous regions. Between 1870 and the 1950s, one part of the region was more negatively exposed to nation-state actions by France and Germany. Both parts were reintegrated in a common French region after WW2. } 
\label{fig:timeline}
\end{minipage}
\end{figure}
 \autoref{fig:timeline} highlights how, after being initially comparable,
the treated area clearly suffered more from the actions of nation-states
for about 80 years from 1871 until the 1950s. This encompasses the
consequences of war between nation-states -- like occupation and
having to change national affiliation -- as well as repression by
the states. As historians describe in great detail, the German period
and the first decades back under French rule were accompanied by a
wide range of discriminatory and repressive nation-state policies
in the treated area \citep[e.g.,][]{Callender1927,carrol2011view}.
\autoref{tab:policies} provides examples of these policies in five
categories, and Table B.1 gives a comprehensive list.\footnote{Tables and Figures starting with a letter are in the online appendix.}

Historians agree that the German nation-building policies backfired
and did not create a German identity among regional citizens, but
they instead fostered regional identity and skepticism against nation-states.
Towards the end of the German period observers report that, ``the
anti-German sentiment of the population is today stronger than ever''
\citep[p.60]{carrol2010socialism}. Henri-Dominique Collin, a leader
of the regional party \textit{Parti Lorrain Indépendant} declared:
``We assert ourselves as Lorrainers (...) and oppose Germany'' \citep[p. 470]{carrol2011view}.
Associating German dialect-speaking individuals with Germanophile
sentiments is described as a ``grossly inaccurate perception'' \citep[p. 71]{zanoun2009interwar}.

After initially welcoming the return to France after WW1, the repressive
and discriminatory French policies further increased the skepticism
towards nation-states. ``Mosellans began to feel anxious at the central
state's assimilation process'' and wanted to ``end what they saw
as France's methodical spoliation of local customs and traditions''
\citep[p. 62]{zanoun2009interwar}. They became ``resentful of the
central powers'' and developed a ``strong resentment towards Germany
and France'' and towards ``centralizing imperatives'' \citep[p. 474]{carrol2011view}
in general. Speaking about the Commision de Triage, one of the repressive
French institutions, the regional politician Eugene Ricklin declared
that they, ``accused me of being a bad Alsatian ... {[}it{]} is the
most shameful institution we have ever seen. Instead of making us
love France, it did just the opposite'' \citep[p. 470]{carrol2011view}. 

\begin{table}[ht!] 	
\caption{Overview of Policy Categories and Examples} 	
\label{tab:policies} 	
\begin{center} 	
\begin{threeparttable} 		\small	 		\tymin=1cm 		\tymax=16cm 		
\begin{tabular}{p{0.2\textwidth} p{0.7\textwidth}}		
			\toprule 			Policy category & Example \\ 			\midrule 			Language policies & 1920: Teaching in local dialect forbidden \citep{grasser1998histoire}. \\ 			\midrule 			Media & 1927/ 28: Banning of three autonomist journals: the ``Volksstimme," the ``Zukunft," and the ``Wahrheit" \citep{goodfellow1993}.\\ \midrule 		
			Social, political, military freedom, equality & 1927/28: Colmar trials: 15 prominent autonomists are arrested and tried for participation in a plot to separate Alsace from France \citep{goodfellow1993}. \\ \midrule 		
			Separation and segregation & 1918: Locals are classified according to an identity-card system. Lower classification leads to e.g., travel bans \citep{harvey1999lost}. \\ \midrule 		
			Regional institutions and administrative personnel  & 1924: Ministerial Declaration by Premier Edouard Herriot imposes a centralized administration, French laws and intuitions \citep{carrol2011view}.\\ 			\bottomrule 		
\end{tabular} 				
\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}  \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} Sources and full list of
policies in Table B.1.}		
\end{minipage} 	
\end{threeparttable} 	
\end{center} 
\end{table}

The impression of being ``a national minority suffering under the
cultural domination of an imperialistic power'' \citep[p. 477]{carrol2011view}
developed, as citizens in the treated area were constantly reminded
``of their minority status within France'' \citep[p. 469]{goodfellow1993}.
During repression, regionalist parties were established to act as
``defenders of the region’s distinctive culture and traditions''
\citep[p. 477]{carrol2011view}. The exposure to conflict led people
in the treated area to ``reassert their pacifism,'' \citep[p. 63]{carrol2010socialism}
and the idea of ``a free Alsace-Lorraine belonging to the United
States of Europe, that bridges France and Germany'' \citep[p. 458]{goodfellow1993}
emerged. 

During WW2, the whole region was occupied by Germany, but again the
treated area reportedly suffered more from the war. This ``further
alienated Alsatians from pro-German movements and concomitantly with
German cultural identity'' \citep[p. 469]{goodfellow1993}. Even
under pressure, ``no party, even among the autonomist groups, officially
collaborated'' \citep[p.23]{anderson1972regional}. A number of citizens
from the treated area were forced to fight for the German army. After
the war was over, these unfortunate soldiers -- the so-called ``malgré-nous''
-- were charged in the Bordeaux Trial for their ``collaboration''
with Germany. This caused massive protests against the French central
state in the treated area, as the soldiers were perceived as being
punished for something beyond their control. Finally, the French government
realized the negative consequences of their approach. In 1953 it declared
a far-reaching amnesty that settled this and other issues, marking
the end of the treatment period. Since then, tensions began to calm
down, and both parts were again subject to the same policies as part
of the same French region.

Qualitative evidence shows that these memories are still alive today
and suggests that public and private regional organizations like parties,
media, and associations played an important role during the treatment
period and still keep those memories alive today. Demonstrators against
a recent territorial reform that was perceived as dictated by the
central government were chanting, ``No to an annexation'', and complained
about, ``history repeating itself, Paris violating our identity''.
Museums like the Mémorial Alsace-Moselle display photographs and documents
about the region's difficult history. Regional TV productions like
the series ``Les Alsaciens ou les Deux Mathilde'' highlight problems
with the central state as part of a family drama.

Often, European integration plays an important role as a perceived
remedy. The Mémorial Alsace-Moselle highlights the ``story of European
integration'' in overcoming the region's historical problems. Among
regionalist parties, ``Unser Land'' specifically campaigns for a
strong region embedded in a supra-national EU framework. The ``Parti
des Mosellans'' highlights that in Alsace and Lorraine ``European
integration must prove itself,'' and the ``Parti Lorrain'' highlights
European integration as one of its founding principles, together with
other reforms that grant less power to the central state. Appendix
C provides more qualitative evidence and all sources.


\section*{Data and Validation of Identification Strategy\label{sec:Data-and-Identification}}

\subsection*{Data}

France is divided into 22 regions, which contain 96 départements.
Those are further divided into 323 arrondisements and 1995 cantons;
the latter however do not possess the status of a legal entity. My
main unit of analysis is the lowest administrative level, the municipality.
Data on EU support exists for a maximum of 3237 municipalities in
the six départements in Alsace and Lorraine.

I use two main proxies for EU support -- three referenda and electoral
success of Eurosceptic parties -- as well as different measures to
capture mechanisms and preferences. All measures are at the municipal
level, unless mentioned otherwise. Details on controls, pre-treatment
variables, and socioeconomic mechanisms can be found in the respective
sections and the online appendix. Table A.1 - A.5
provide all details and descriptive statistics. \vspace{0cm}

\paragraph*{EU Support -- 1972 Referendum about the European Communities (EC) Enlargement:}

On 23 April 1972, voters were asked whether they approved of Denmark,
Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom joining the EC. The referendum
was approved by 68.3\% of voters in France. As for the following referenda,
I compute agreement as the share of yes-votes of all valid votes.
Data for 1972 are only available at the département level.\vspace{-0.5cm}

\paragraph*{EU Support -- 1992 Referendum about the Treaty of Maastricht:}

The Maastricht Treaty, also known as Treaty of the European Union
(TEU), introduced the three pillar structure of the EU. This augmented
economic cooperation with a common foreign and security policy and
with the fields justice and home affairs. The TEU is seen as, until
then, the furthest reaching integration step in EU history \citep{moravcsik1998choice},
as it greatly expanded EU competences outlined in the creation of
the Euro. Important for minorities, it resulted in the shifting of
some nation-state powers either to the EU or to sub-national authorities
\citep{mandrino2008}, and the importance of the European Court of
Justice was explicitly recognized. Three countries held a referendum
to ratify the treaty, including France. In the end, a close majority
of 50.8\% of French voters approved it. \vspace{-0.5cm}

\paragraph*{EU Support -- 2005 Referendum on Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe:}

This treaty intended to replace existing EU treaties with a single
constitution. As the referenda before, it would have been a major
step towards more integration, for instance by replacing unanimity
with qualified majority voting in more policy areas. Moreover, it
further strengthened the EU as an actor compared to the nation-states.
It was rejected by 55\% of French voters; later parts of it were integrated
in the Lisbon Treaty. \vspace{-0.5cm}

\paragraph*{EU Support -- Eurosceptic Parties:}

The aim is to measure the success of Eurosceptic parties in the three
European elections taking place between the referenda in 1992 and
2005: in 1994, 1999, and 2004. Besides the temporal fit with the two
referenda, we know that the notion of a ``Europe of the regions''
that protected and empowered minority regions against central states
was politically salient during those years.\footnote{Qualitative evidence suggest that the hopes of regions were partly
disappointed. In the cases of Scotland's and Catalonia's independence
referenda, the EU supported the nation-state governments instead.} My first measure classifies a party as Eurosceptic if it has a net
positive Eurosceptic score in the manifesto project database \citep{Volkens2018},
which contains time-varying assessments regarding the EU.\footnote{See \href{https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu}{https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu},
accessed 04.29.2019. I make one adjustment. In 1999, the ``Union
pour l'Europe des nations'' ran as an independent joint list, representing
the parties ``Rassemblement pour la République (RPF)'' and ``Mouvement
pour la France (MPF)''. The list was clearly Eurosceptic, but not
listed in the manifesto database as it was not related to one specific
party. As it received about 13\% of the votes in France in the 1999
election, I count it as a Eurosceptic party for the first two measures.}

One potential issue with the first measure is that the far-right party
Front National (FN) is a large party within the Eurosceptic group,
but it also took on strong nationalistic positions. Regions with a
history of tensions with the nation-state might for that reason reject
to vote for the party, which could lead to a bias. Hence, I also create
a second Eurosceptic measure without the FN. Finally, the previous
two measures rely on binary distinctions. For my last measure, I construct
a continuous proxy for Euroscepticism by multiplying the vote share
of each party running in the elections with the Euroscepticism score
assigned to that party in the manifesto database. \autoref{tab:desc_out}
provides descriptive statistics for the outcomes.

\begin{table}[ht]
\centering \def\sym#1{\ifmmode^{#1}\else\(^{#1}\)\fi} 
\caption{Descriptive Table for Outcomes} 
\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{@{}l *5{>{\centering\arraybackslash}X}@{}} 
&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Obs.}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Mean}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Std. Dev.}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Min.}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Max.}} \\  \midrule 
\input{"Tables/Table2_Descriptive_1.tex"} 
\input{"Tables/Table2_Descriptive_2.tex"} 
\midrule
\end{tabularx}
\label{tab:desc_out}
\end{table} 
\FloatBarrier
\vspace{-1cm}

\paragraph*{Mechanisms and Preferences: }

Other data are described in the respective sections and the appendix.
Regarding survey data, the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique
(OIP) -- conducted between 1987 and 2003 -- is by far the best source
in terms of coverage and number of participants at the French département
level. Questions vary between waves, and several waves captures preferences
about exit or integration, as well as identity. 

\subsection*{Identification\label{subsec:Identification}}

Which assumptions are required to estimate a causal effect in this
natural experiment \citep[cf.,][]{sekhon2012natural}? First, for
the control group to be a valid counterfactual for the treated group,
there should be no differences between the two in absence of the treatment.
As the whole region shares a joint history, we can at least test whether
there were no pre-treatment differences between both parts. Shortly
before the French revolution in 1789, Louis XVI's felt the need to
send out his bureaucrats throughout the country to assess the loyalty
of his citizens. The resulting data, known as the ``Cahiers de Doléances,''
specifically ask about the relative strength of regional identity
compared to national identity. Figure \ref{fig:cahier} shows that
there are no systematic differences between treated and control areas
for the two ``estates'' (classes) of the French population, and
that the average response in the treated and control area is essentially
identical.

\vspace{-0.5cm}
\begin{figure}[ht!] \centering \includegraphics[width=0.65\textwidth]{Graphs/Fig3_Cahiers_de_Doleances.pdf} \vspace{-0.3cm}
\caption{Cahiers de Doléances} 
\label{fig:cahier} 
\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}  \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} Based on the city-area level Cahiers de dol\'eances from 1789, as quantified by \cite{hyslop1968french}. The city-area measures are based on more disaggregate reports in verbal form. The value 3 corresponds to ``National patriotism strongest," 2 corresponds to ``Mixed loyalties: national patriotism combined with regionalism or other," and 1 corresponds to ``Regional, or other, outweigh national patriotism." I have data for two classes that represent ordinary French citizens: "third estate," as well as the category "unified orders." Mean refers to the arithmetic average. Table A.1 shows the location of Cahiers units.}
\end{minipage} 
\end{figure}
\vspace{-0.3cm}
\FloatBarrier

Second, the assignment of units into in the treated and control area
should be as good as random. Technically, strict randomness is not
required, but the assignment must have been orthogonal to the outcome.
Third, more subtle, but important, historical designs such as mine
make the assumption that after the treatment, no third factors that
are unrelated to the treatment affect the outcomes differently. Compared
to many studies examining long-term persistent effects, I am able
to examine outcomes relatively shortly after the treatment (first
referendum), as well as more in the mid term. Fourth, to ensure that
municipalities are not differentially profiting from EU integration
today, I focus on differences between municipalities that are geographically
close at the treatment border. I estimate my spatial regression discontinuity
design using a local linear regression:
\begin{equation}
y_{i}=\alpha+\beta\:Treatment_{i}+\theta\:Distance\:border_{i}\vartimes Treatment_{i}+z_{i}'\gamma+\delta_{s}+\epsilon_{i}.
\end{equation}

$y_{i}$ is the outcome at the municipal level. $Treatment_{i}$ is
a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the municipality is in the
treated area and 0 otherwise. The linear term for the forcing variable,
$Distance\ border_i$, is allowed to vary in slope on both sides of
the border. Conditional on this forcing variable, $\beta$ captures
the causal effect of the differences in negative exposure to nation-state
actions. 

My preferred specification uses fixed effects ($\delta_{s}$) for
five equally long border-segments, as well as controls for distance
to the five largest cities in the regions ($z_i$). This ensures that
municipalities on the other side of the border which are selected
as counterfactuals are also geographically close. I compute results
for two bandwidths: ten kilometers and the efficient bandwidth \citep{calonico2015optimal}.
Ten kilometers is picked as the minimum bandwidth given the average
diameter of a municipality; to a large extent this captures only municipalities
directly at the border.\footnote{Distance is computed based on the centroid of a municipality polygon.
Below ten kilometers, municipalities would be dropped from the estimations,
even though their polygon directly touches the treatment border. Figure D.3
shows that all main results hold for varying bandwidths.} Standard errors are clustered at the canton level -- the second-lowest
administrative division in France -- accounting for potential correlation
across space within cantons. 

\begin{figure}[H]
\caption{Smoothness in Pre-Treatment Variables at the Border}
 \centering \label{fig:smoothness_cov}

\vspace{-0.2cm}


\hspace{-1.5cm}\includegraphics[scale=0.9]{Graphs/Fig4_Smoothness_in_PreTreatment_Variables_at_the_Border}\vspace{-0.4cm}

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth} \centering  \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} RD coefficients with 95\% confidence interval. All  variables are standardized with mean zero and variance one. Detailed regression results in Table D.1.} 
\end{minipage}
\end{figure}

I begin by using the formal RD specification to augment the historical
narrative about the border being as-if random with more systematic
evidence. If the border location was decided upon from far away in
Paris and driven by pride rather than strategic considerations, we
would not expect differences at the border in geographic and pre-treatment
socioeconomic measures. \autoref{fig:smoothness_cov} shows that for
geographical factors that would suggest strategic considerations influenced
the exact local position of the border, there are no discontinuities.
I also gathered data from various sources to show that there are no
pre-treatment discontinuities in a wide range of socioeconomic variables
like population \citep{communes_2003}, the share of cropland and
grazing land (from HYDE v.3.2), road length \citep{perret2015roads},
and railroad connection and quality \citep{mimeur2018revisiting}.
Furthermore, Table D.2 shows no discontinuities for
ten years before the division in 1860 in measures like wages and revenues,
which are available at the arrondisement level. The absence of significant
discontinuities further supports that local geographic, political
or economic conditions did not decide the precise border location.

\FloatBarrier

\section*{Main Results\label{sec:Results}}

\subsection*{European Union Support - Referenda}

I begin by considering differences in EU support between the treatment
and control area in the 1972 referendum about the European Communities
enlargement. It is clearly visible in Figure \ref{fig:Yes_referendum1}a
that the average agreement of about 85\% in the treated area is considerably
higher than the 72\% in the control area. The map also shows that
EU support is higher in each individual treated département than in
any of the control départements. This comparison allows no causal
interpretation, but the results less than two decades after the treatment
ended allow us to track the persistence of differences over time and
rule out that events after 1972 are the root-cause of potential differences
in the 1990s.

The first set of causal results then considers the referenda in 1992
and 2005. Figure \ref{fig:Yes_referendum2}b shows a map with the
average municipal-level share of yes-votes, and an RD plot to illustrate
the approach and effect. The map shows that, as in 1972, agreement
for further EU integration remains considerably higher in the treated
area. The RD plot shows a clear jump upwards in agreement at the border,
conditional on the running variable.\footnote{Table D.4 shows that the higher support for the EU
is not driven by differences in turnout.}

\begin{figure}[!th]
\caption{EU Support and Euroscepticism - Maps and RD Plots\label{fig:Main-RD-Plot}}

\begin{center}

\noindent\begin{minipage}[t]{1\columnwidth}%
\center a.) Average Agreement in EU Referendum 1972 in \% \label{fig:Yes_referendum1}%
\end{minipage}

\smallskip{}
\begin{tabular}{cc}
\hspace{0.3cm}\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{\string"Graphs/Fig5a_Average_Agreement_in_EU_Referendum_1972\string".pdf} & \qquad{}\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{\string"Graphs/Fig5a_map_Average_Agreement_in_EU_Referendum_1972\string".pdf}\tabularnewline
\end{tabular}

\bigskip{}

\noindent\begin{minipage}[t]{1\columnwidth}%
\center b.) Agreement in EU Referenda, Average in 1992 \& 2005 in
\% \label{fig:Yes_referendum2}%
\end{minipage}

\smallskip{}
\begin{tabular}{cc}
\includegraphics[scale=0.57]{Graphs/Fig5b_Agreement_in_EU_Referenda_Average_in_1992_2005} & \qquad{}\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{Graphs/Fig5b_map_Agreement_in_EU_Referenda_Average_in_1992_2005}\tabularnewline
\end{tabular}

\bigskip{}

\noindent\begin{minipage}[t]{1\columnwidth}%
\center c.) Average Vote Share Eurosceptic Parties in EU Parliamentary
Elections 1994-2004 in \% \label{fig:yes_referendum3}%
\end{minipage}

\smallskip{}
\begin{tabular}{cc}
\includegraphics[scale=0.57]{Graphs/Fig5c_Average_Vote_Share_Eurosceptic_Parties} & \qquad{}\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{Graphs/Fig5c_map_Average_Vote_Share_Eurosceptic_Parties}\tabularnewline
\end{tabular}

\end{center}

\FloatBarrier
\end{figure}

\FloatBarrier\begin{center}
\begin{table}[h!]
\centering \def\sym#1{\ifmmode^{#1}\else\(^{#1}\)\fi} \small
\caption{RD Results - EU Support and Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005) } 
\resizebox{\textwidth}{!}{
\begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
\textbf{Panel A}  &\multicolumn{6}{c}{\textbf{EU Support (Share yes-votes  1992 and 2005)}} \vspace{1mm}  \\ \midrule
\textbf{Dependent Variable}  &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{1992}} &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{2005}} &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{1992 \& 2005}} \\ 
&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(1)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(2)}}  &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(3)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(4)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(5)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(6)}} \\ \midrule 
\input{"Tables/Table3_PanelA.tex"} 
\input{"Tables/Table3_PanelA_Mean_of_Outcome.tex"} \\ \vspace{-7mm} \\
\textbf{Panel B}  &\multicolumn{6}{c}{\textbf{Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)}} \vspace{1mm}  \\ \midrule 
\textbf{Dependent Variable}  &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Eurosceptic Parties}}  &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{w/o Front National}} &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Eurosceptism Index}}  \\ 
&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(1)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(2)}}  &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(3)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(4)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(5)}} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(6)}} \\ \midrule 
\input{"Tables/Table3_PanelB.tex"} 
\input{"Tables/Table3_PanelB_Mean_of_Outcome.tex"} 
\end{tabular}} \vspace{1mm} 
\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}  \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting  ``Yes" in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B,  the outcomes in Columns 1  is the share of people voting  for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a net negative EU related score in their manifestos between 1992 and 2003. We list the parties and their EU related scores in Table D.14. The outcome in column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties.  Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls are the distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered on the cantonal level, are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, the left column uses a narrow bandwidth of 10km, the right column the efficient bandwidth (mean square error criterion, \citep{calonico2017rdrobust}). Full regression results in Tables D.11 and D.12.}	
\end{minipage} 
\label{tab:RDD_main_}
\end{table} 
\end{center}
\FloatBarrier
\vspace{-1cm}

\autoref{tab:RDD_main_} shows the results from the RD estimations,
always using ten kilometers and the efficient bandwidth. In 1992,
the treatment effect shows 5 and 6 percentage points higher agreement
in the treated area. Relative to the mean outcome of about 53\%, this
is a meaningfully large difference and statistically significant with
p-values smaller than 0.01. The difference in 2005 is smaller at 2.8
percentage points, with p-values slightly above 0.1. The smaller size
of the coefficient can partly be attributed to the fact that average
agreement was also about ten percentage points lower than in 1992.
When considering the two referenda jointly in a pooled cross-section
in columns 5 and 6, the treatment effects of 4 and 4.7 percentage
points are statistically significant at the 1\%-level. Accordingly,
being more negatively exposed to the actions by nation-states in the
past led to a persistent and sizable positive effect on European Union
support in three referenda over a period of 37 years.

\subsection*{EU Support - Euroscepticism}

This section uses the three different definitions of political success
of Eurosceptic parties outlined in the Data section. In line with
the referenda results on higher EU support, the map in Figure \ref{fig:Yes_referendum2}c
indicates that Euroscepticism is lower in the treated area. The RD
plot shows a negative jump at the border. Table \ref{tab:RDD_main_},
panel B, then also reveals a significant negative effect on Euroscepticism.
The size of the effect differs between the estimations and needs to
be interpreted in relation to the mean of the outcome. In column 2,
the vote share is 1.7 percentage points lower relative to a mean of
about 14\%. Omitting the nationalist party Front National leads to
a relatively larger effect, corresponding to a lower vote share by
1.8 to 2.3 percentage points, against a mean of about 7. Finally,
columns 5 and 6 use the overall weighted Euroscepticism index score,
the most comprehensive and my preferred measure of Euroscepticism.
Again, Eurosceptic positions are significantly less successful in
the treated area. For all measures, the effects are statistically
significant with p-values below 0.05 when using the efficient bandwidth;
the very conservative 10km bandwidth specifications are still at least
close to the 0.1 threshold, but more importantly yield comparable
point estimates.

\FloatBarrier

\subsection*{Potential Effect of Historical Linguistic Differences}

To some extent, in particular in the most southern areas, the treatment
border coincides with the historical linguistic border dividing German
and French dialect speakers. This could bias the results on EU support
if, for instance, German dialect speakers would generally be more
favorable towards the EU. To address this potential issue, I exclude
these parts of the border and rely only on a comparison between the
treated and control areas within the French dialect area. The right-hand
side of Figure \ref{fig:linguistic_border} illustrates this border
modification. The coefficient plot on the left-hand side of the figure
shows that even when considering only the discontinuities within also
linguistically homogeneous regions, the treatment effects for the
referenda and Euroscepticism remain stable with regard to size and
statistical significance.

\begin{figure}[H]
\caption{Robustness - Modified Border Excluding Overlaps with Linguistic Border}
\label{fig:linguistic_border}

\subfloat{\includegraphics[scale=0.6]{Graphs/Fig6_Robustness}}\hfill{}\subfloat{\includegraphics[scale=0.28]{Graphs/Fig6_Robustness_map}}

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth} \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} The coefficient plot displays the main and alternative treatment coefficients, with standard errors clustered on the cantonal level. EU support is average of the share of people voting  ``Yes" in the Maastricht referendum 1992 and in the European Constitution referendum in 2005. Euroscepticism is the weighted eurosceptic party share in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. Baseline is the complete border, modified only the part not overlapping with language border (see figure on the right). Optimal bandwidth is selected following mean square error criterion (\citep{calonico2017rdrobust}). Included controls are distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse. Corresponding regression results in Table D.10. Figure D.1 shows the results of a further test excluding all German-speaking municipalities altogether. Figure D.2 presents the results for additional outcomes. Source of linguistic border: \cite{harp1998}.} 
\end{minipage}
\end{figure}

\FloatBarrier

\section*{Preferences and Mechanisms\label{sec:Mechanisms}}

\subsection*{Mechanisms: Socioeconomics, Policy, or Identity}

This setting does not allow for pinning down exactly through which
mechanism memories of historical experiences are kept alive and lead
to potential differences. The qualitative evidence in the section, the Division of Alsace and Lorraine as a Natural Experiment, and in Section C.5 in the appendix suggests an active
role of regional organizations. I try to rule out other explanations
here, Appendix C discusses more details. 

I find no significant changes in population - potentially caused by
the treatment - at the border, suggesting that this does not explain
the differences in EU support (\autoref{fig:smoothness_post_treatment},
panel A). Taken together, neither population changes nor other policies
associated with the more negative historical exposure to nation-states
led to significant differences in socioeconomic aspects, which could
directly explain support for supra-national integration (panel B).
Finally, although the treated and control areas correspond to different
départements -- within the same administrative region -- there is
no evidence of significant discontinuities in public good provision,
which could influence preferences (panel C).

\begin{figure}[H]
\caption{Mechanisms - Population Changes, Socioeconomic Factors, and Public
Goods}
 \centering \label{fig:smoothness_post_treatment}

\hspace{-2.5cm}\includegraphics[scale=0.9]{Graphs/Fig7_Mechanisms}\vspace{-0.5cm}

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth} \footnotesize{\textbf{Notes:} Panel A-C show RD, Panel D OLS coefficients,  with 95\% confidence interval. Public good provision is measured per capita. We use the oldest available measures since 1990 (year in parentheses), see Figure C.2 for additional years. All  variables were standardized with mean zero and variance one. Included controls in panel A-C are the distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects.  Detailed results in Table D.3. OLS regressions in panel D are at the département level and control for respondent age, employment status, education and sex. Source of European identity measures are the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). } 	
\end{minipage}
\end{figure}

\vspace{-0.2cm}

Alternatively, I test the idea that a joint European identity positively
influences support for European Integration, as proposed by Hooghe
and Marks \citeyearpar{hooghe2004does,hooghe2005calculation} and
highlighted in constructivist theories \citep{hooghe2019theory}.
A sense of the common suffering of Europeans from repeated wars and
repression by nation-states during prior centuries, and the hope that
EU integration can be a remedy, could lead to such a stronger sense
of community. I use three survey measures for European identity, combining
various waves of the French OIP surveys. I estimate an effect using
OLS with individual controls at the département level, essentially
comparing the conditional means between the treated and control areas.
Panel D shows that indeed there seems to be a significantly stronger
EU identity in the treated area. Depending on the proxy, European
identity is a quarter to a third of a standard deviation stronger.

\FloatBarrier

\subsection*{Preferences for Exit and Integration}

One cornerstone of my theoretical framework is that exit and integration
options can both be means to constrain the higher-level government-unit
responsible for negative historical experiences. This should be reflected
in preferences to move decision-making power away from the nation-state
level -- upwards or downwards. The département-level results in \autoref{tab:OLS_opinions2},
based again on the OIP surveys, provide convincing evidence in line
with my theory.

\begin{center}
\begin{table}[ht]
\centering \def\sym#1{\ifmmode^{#1}\else\(^{#1}\)\fi} \footnotesize
\caption{Nested Identities: EU, National, and  Regional (Alsace \& Lorraine) Level }  \label{tab:OLS_opinions2}
\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{@{}l *3{>{\centering\arraybackslash}X}@{}}
&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(1)}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(2)}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{(3)}}   \\ \midrule \vspace{-4mm} \\
\textbf{Panel A}  &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{Treatment Effect on Strength of Identities}} \vspace{1mm} \\ \midrule
\textbf{Dependent Variable}&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Regional Identity}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{French Identity}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{European Identity}} \\ \midrule 
\input{"Tables/Table4_PanelA.tex"} \\ \vspace{-7mm} \\
\textbf{Panel B}  &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{Preferred Level of Decision-Making}} \vspace{1mm} \\ \midrule
\textbf{Dependent Variable}&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Regional Level}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{National Level}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{European Level}} \\ \midrule 
\input{"Tables/Table4_PanelB.tex"} \\ \vspace{-7mm} \\
\textbf{Panel C}  &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{Preferred Level Compared to Alternative}} \vspace{1mm} \\ \midrule
\textbf{Prefer decision-making at ...}&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Regional Level}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{National Level}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{European Level}} \\ 
\textbf{compared to ...}&\multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{National Level}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{European Level}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\textbf{Regional Level}} \\ \midrule  
\input{"Tables/Table4_PanelC.tex"} 
\end{tabularx}
\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}  \footnotesize{\textbf{Sources:} Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). \textit{``X" Identity}: ``Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case), and the region, asked in separate questions. These questions where available for the years 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001. Main question panel B and C: ``In your opinion, should the development of your region occur according to a plan decided by the region, the state or the European Union?," only available in 1991. In panel B, \textit{``X" Level} is a dummy variable indicating the choice of ``X" (Region, State or EU). In panel C, for each column the sample is reduced only the respondents chosing either Option 1 or 2 (Option 1 = 1; Option 2 = 0). The European Identity measure in panel D is identical to the first measure in \autoref{fig:smoothness_post_treatment}. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero. } 
\end{minipage} 
\end{table}
\end{center}
\vspace{-1cm}

%\FloatBarrier

I begin by examining differences in regional, national French, and
European identity. Indeed, I find no effect on national identity but
a significantly stronger regional AND European identity \citealp[provide more evidence on regional identity]{dehdarigehring2018origins}.
This is evidence that people in the treated area did not simply become
more cosmopolitan or overcome existing lower-level identities per
se. Rather, in line with my theory, devolution (exit) and upward (European)
integration align with preferences for lower- or higher-level decision-making.
The fact that French identity is only insignificantly weaker indicates
that the motivation of people after so many decades is not mere grievances
against fellow Frenchmen, but rather the fear to suffer again from
actions by nation-state governments.

However, the decisive metric for preferences about the vertical distribution
of power is the preferred level of decision-making in the treated
versus control area. In line with the identity differences, panel
B shows a stronger preference for decision-making at either the regional
OR the European level -- in line with regional and European identity
being stronger relative to national identity.\footnote{Table D.18 shows very similar differences
across three different age cohorts. Table D.19
further indicates that the effect is not significantly influenced
by demographic characteristics. } Panel C considers the possible levels as alternatives to each other.
The results are again clear. Respondents in the treated area prefer
both the regional and the European level compared to the national
level (columns 1 and 2).

\section*{Placebo Tests and Sensitivity\label{sec:Placebo-tests-and}}

Three placebo tests help to verify the validity of the main results.
The first two examine to what degree the prior results could be driven
by general differences between border départements and the rest of
the country. The first uses a placebo border between all French border
départements and the next adjacent départements -- excluding the
départements in my main analysis. The second test moves the treatment
border one département further towards the center, now focusing on
the border between Alsace and Lorraine and the region Champagne-Ardenne.\footnote{Based on the delineation of regions in 2005.}
The third test uses the old département border within Lorraine prior
to 1870. Differences within the region before the actual treatment
period could signal a potentially problematic heterogeneity already
existed before the division. Figure \ref{fig:placebo} (a) to (c)
visualize the respective placebo borders in yellow. 

Figure \ref{fig:placebo} (d) shows the results, focusing on the average
of the 1992 and 2005 referenda and the Euroscepticism score as my
preferred outcomes. None of the placebo effects turn out to be significant,
and all are considerably smaller than the actual effects. Hence, there
is no evidence that the effect is driven by pre-existing differences
or border départements generally being different.

\begin{figure}[h] 
\centering 
\caption{Placebo Borders}
\subfloat[Départements at the French Border]{\includegraphics[width=0.4 \textwidth]{Graphs/Fig8a_Departements_French_Border.pdf}} \hfill
\subfloat[Control Area vs. Rest of France Border]{\includegraphics[width=0.4 \textwidth]{Graphs/Fig8b_Control_area_vs_rest_of_France_border.pdf}} \\
\subfloat[Pre-1870 Meurthe-Moselle Border]{\includegraphics[width=0.4 \textwidth]{Graphs/Fig8c_Pre1870_MeurtheMoselle_Border.pdf}} \hfill
\subfloat[Coefficient Plots at Placebo Borders]{\includegraphics[width=0.55 \textwidth]{Graphs/Fig8d_Placebo_Borders.pdf}}\\
\begin{center} 
\begin{minipage}{\textwidth} \scriptsize{\textbf{Notes:} Map A shows the départements at the French border (black) and their adjacent départements (grey). This excludes the départements that constitute Alsace and Lorraine and the second-row département Haute Marne. Haute Marne has no counterfactual on the first-row side due to this exclusion of the Alsace and Lorraine regions. The border separating first and second row départements is used as a placebo border (bold orange line). Map B displays the border between the former départements Meurthe and Moselle before 1871 (bold orange line). Map C shows the border between the control départments in the main regression and their adjacent départements inland (bold orange line). The coefficient plot displays the placebo treatment coefficients. \textit{EU Support} is the average share of people voting  ``Yes" in the 1992 and 2005 referenda. \textit{Euroscepticism} is the Eurosceptism score EU parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (\citep{calonico2017rdrobust}). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and  distance to Mulhouse. Detailed results in Table D.13.} 
\end{minipage}  
\end{center}
\label{fig:placebo} 
\end{figure} 
\FloatBarrier

\noindent My main results are also robust to a large variety of sensitivity
tests, shown and discussed in more detail in the online appendix.
For instance, they remain very similar with regard to sign and magnitude
without controls (Table D.6), when clustering
on a different level (Table D.7), controlling
for latitude and longitude (Table D.8) or
additionally controlling for pre-treatment variables (Table D.9).
Figure D.3 shows all main results are robust
to a variety of alternative RD bandwidths. Table D.15
shows robustness of the euroscepticism results to using an alternative
to the manifesto data, Figure D.4
and Figure D.5 provide further
département-level evidence that the differences already existed prior
to 1994.

\section*{Conclusion\label{sec:Conclusion}}

This paper outlines a theoretical framework to consider how negative
historical experiences with higher-level governments affect preferences
about the vertical distribution of power. It is often implicitly assumed
that such events lead to preferences for exit strategies -- decentralization,
autonomy, secession. I explain why and under what conditions integration
-- centralization, supra-nationalism, delegation to international
organizations (IOs) -{}- can be a feasible alternative for affected
groups and regions. This fosters our understanding of federalism \citep[e.g.,][]{rodden2006hamilton,Rodden02}
in general, as well as secessionism \citep[e.g.,][]{Cederman15,gehringReg2016}
and international integration more specifically. 

By highlighting that deep-rooted historical differences can explain
considerable differences in EU support, the paper contributes to a
growing literature about the importance of history in influencing
current preferences and behavior \citep[e.g.,][]{foukavoth2016,mazumder2018persistent,rozenas_zhukov_2019}.
I connect those historical influences theoretically to preferences
in a setting where such influences have been largely disregarded.
The empirical results document a source of persistently stronger support
for European Union (EU) integration. This highlights the role of the
EU as an IO that contributes to maintaining peace between its members
and helps prevent member-states from implementing discriminatory policies
against minority regions. In times where international cooperation
and multilateralism are under attack, this is an important and novel
insight for our understanding of support for supra-national integration
and IOs. 

The paper also provides a more comprehensive picture of the origins
of current political preferences. It augments an existing EU support
literature that largely focuses on the role of personality traits,
individual socioeconomic features and domestic politics. My framework
helps to better understand why many minority regions and those experiencing
tensions with their nation-states exhibit strong electoral support
for regionalist parties but at the same time also support for supra-national
integration. I thus augment existing correlational evidence for the
EU by showing that historical tensions with nation-states causally
influence individual preferences and voting behavior today. Qualitative
evidence suggests that regional private and public organizations play
an important role in keeping historical memories salient.

The theoretical framework provides insights beyond this application by highlighting the importance of historical tensions between different levels in multi-level governance systems for preferences about the vertical distribution of power. By explicitly outlining the conditions under which those events can influence preferences and actions towards supporting integration strategies, the framework can be adapted to other circumstances. The findings also raise several interesting questions. For instance, future research could explore to what extent central government policies or modes of political representation condition the persistent effect of history. To what degree are unitary states different than federal states? What is the relationship between changes in decentralization within countries and support for integration?

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